

Saddam Hussein

**ON
OIL
NATIONALISATION
IN IRAQ**

Ath - Thawra House - Baghdad

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ATH-THAWRA HOUSE BAGHDAD-IRAQ

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**Full text of the interview
conducted by "Ath-Thawra" with
Comrade Saddam Hussein, Deputy
Secretary-General of the Regional Leadership of the Arab
Ba'ath Socialist Party and Deputy Chairman of the Revolution
Command Council on June 1st,
1973 on the first anniversary of
the battle of oil nationalisation.**

INTRODUCTION

**The nationalisation of Iraqi oil crowned a
dununtless unremitting struggle that lasted for
over half a century against foreign domination and
alien exploitation.** That persistent struggle, which
flared up in an armed rebellion in the early days
of foreign occupation in 1920, kept alive in various
courageous forms punctuated by several popular
uprisings, culminating in the July 14 (1958) Revolu-
tion and the ruling twin July 17 (1968) Revolu-
tion.

**One can safely say that oil was the fuel of the
glorious struggle of the Iraqi people for economic**

independence and social progress.

Britain occupied Iraq by military force in 1917—1918; and in 1924, **West European cartels** gained oil concessions, detrimental to Iraqi sovereignty and interests.

The **American monopolies** forced their way in 1928 and became partners with the **West European oil cartels**. Since then, the foreign company exploiting the Iraqi oil carried the name of **Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC)**, incorporating all the famous “Big Eight.”

The IPC, taking control over the Mosul Oil Company (founded in 1932) and establishing the Basrah Oil Company in 1938, managed, in the latter year, to become the sole monopoliser of oil fields in the entire country.

Thus Iraq lost control over the main source of its national wealth by virtue of tyrannic concess-

ions usurped by foreign monopolies aided by reactionary puppet Iraqi governments.

The core of I.P.C.'s policy was to reduce production and lower prices, despite the fact that Iraqi oil **exells** the other oil of the area. Their ultimate goal was to keep Iraq as a **reserve area**, **heedless of the abyss of misery in which the Iraqi people lived**. Their mal-practices included: denial of the right of Iraq to partnership; failure to comply with their financial obligations; fraudulent accounts; failure to process oil.. etc.

On the other hand, those monopolies were actually a **state within the stae** - not subject to domestic laws. Their presence was a real danger to Iraqi independence and progress.

All endeavours to reach a satisfactory settlement with them were in vain.

Economic independence is one of the main

aims of the July 17 Revolution. This meant nothing less than the liberation of the country's oil resources, being the basic source of income.

Another more important aim is the consolidation of the country's independence. The presence of the oil companies did not only arrest the economic progress of the country. It also menaced the country's independence and threatened any revolutionary tendency and conflicted with the Revolution's ultimate aim of: unity, freedom and socialism.

Despite the hostile attitudes of the foreign oil monopolies that became open, particularly after the Israeli aggression against the Arab in 1967, the July 17 Revolution still looked for a new relationship, ensuring the Iraqi interests and the development of oil production.

With that spirit, the Revolution entered into

negotiations with the oil companies hoping, in the words of the Iraqi negotiator, “**to start a new page of positive relations - relations which do not lead to harming others' interests**”.

Though the Iraqi demands were not only legitimate but also reasonable, the companies pursued their usual policy of procrastination and intransigence and used their conventional weapon of **reducing production**.

Therefore, the Revolution took the initiative to exercise national sovereignty and nationalise the operations of IPC on **June 1st 1972**, thus restoring to the people of Iraq their long lost legitimate rights.

The decision of nationalisation conforms with United Nations resolutions on the subject, the rulings of the International Court of Justice and other universal judicial bodies, and the undisputed

acknowledgement of the principle of nationalisation by imperialist states themselves.

The Iraqi government, though practising an act of sovereignty, forgave past injustice and plundering and decided to pay a fair compensation to the IPC.

The oil monopolies, lest the Iraqi decision constitute a precedent in the most oil-rich area of the world, at a time of a menacing shortage of increasingly needed energy, **did all they could to foil the Iraqi nationalisation decision.**

But, mainly depending upon the people, who firmly stood behind the decision with spontaneous sacrifice, and thanks to friends in the entire world, particularly the Socialist Countries headed by the Soviet Union, the decision of nationalisation was successfully implemented.

This led to the triumph of March 1st 1973,

when the oil companies surrendered and the dispute was finally settled in the interest of the Iraqi people.

THE BATTLE OF OIL NATIONALIASATION

Following is the text of an interview conducted by the Editor-in-Chief of "Ath-Thawra" daily of Baghdad:

* * *

The battle of nationalisation is a unique struggle. Primarily, it is one of the most critical and dangerous battles fought by the Arab Revolution. Quite a lot has been written and said about it. But many of its crucial, bright and inspiring aspects remained undisclosed.

Despite the modesty for which the leadership of

our Party and Revolution are known, we found, on the first anniversary of that glorious battle, that history calls upon the leadership to speak of that unique accomplishment.

The request was placed before Comarade Saddam Hussein, Deputy Secretary-General of the Regional Leadership of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party, Deputy Chairman of the Revolution Command Council and Chairman of the Follow-up Committee for Oil Affairs and Implementation of Agreements (the supreme committee entrusted with the oil policy in the country). The outcome is this historically valuable talk given by Comrade Saddam Hussein to the Editor-in-Chief of "Ath-Thawra":

QUESTION No.1

The oil nationalisation decision of June 1st is sometimes described as a “revolution”, in the sense that it is an independent accomplishment - unrelated to the progress of the Revolution led by the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party since the 17-30 July Revolution. What do you think of this?... and what is your perspective of the link between the nationalisation operation and the general progress of the Revolution and its future aims?

Comrade Saddam Hussein:

Despite the difficulty that one faces while speaking about a feat created and directed by a leadership of which one is a member...despite the embarrassment aroused by such a talk, because the exploit primarily belongs to the Party and the masses ... despite the fact that the leadership of the Revolution is not accustomed to speak directly (as necessitated by the way the question is put) on aspects related to the strategic thinking of the Revolution and the undeclared tactical practices and their requisites.... notwithstanding

all this, it might be useful to place some facts before the masses so that they may know what ground they are standing on and what responsibilities they are to be shouldering for the continuation of our progress.

Speaking of the oil nationalisation as a revolutionary operation restricted to June 1st, or confined to the period between serving the ultimatum to the companies on 17.5.1972 and the adoption of the nationalisation resolution, is unfair to the resolution, unfair to our people and unfair to the Party. By so doing we would have screened vital facts.

Those who speak of June 1st as a revolution and talk about March 1st that assured the victory as a crowning revolution, or as a final culmination, might be motivated by enthusiasm for these two accomplishments and by appreciation of the will

power and the skilful planning behind them. But, let us leave enthusiasm aside and appraise this concept according to scientific and revolutionary criteria.

June 1st was not a revolution in itself. It was an integral part of a revolution. It was an action that was coherent and consistent with the concepts and progress of that revolution. It was rather one of the needs of the progress of that revolution. Neither June 1st, nor the subsequent March 1st, was a final culmination of that progress..... But they were definitely "the culmination" of the phase within which the two events occurred. Both June 1st and March 1st were a logical, rather an inevitable, outcome of the line started on 17-30 July 1968 and of the skill of the political brain and the revolutionary will embodied in the leadership of the Revolution and the

Party that personally guided that line throughout its various stages.

When we adopted the nationalisation resolution, many people, undoubtedly including many good persons, thought that the series of measures, activities and alliances which we made (domestically and in the Arab and international spheres) were specifically directed to serve the ends of nationalisation. In fact, those measures, activities and alliances were not exclusively intended for, and solely connected with, the plan for realising this aim. **They were directed to and connected with a more general strategy, i.e., the strategy of the Revolution** led by our Party ever since 17-30 July 1968, of which nationalisation is a part.

Had those measures, activities and alliances been particularly devised to serve the aim of oil nationalisation alone, the case would have been

totally different. Then, they would have assumed a temporary nature - a tactical nature. As such, they would have been viewed differently, specially so, after the accomplishment of March 1st that compelled the monopolising companies surrender our legitimate rights.

But, we view the question in a different way. June 1st and later March 1st, are **part of the progress of the Revolution**. Their preludes are part of the preliminaries and requirements of the march of the Revolution towards attaining its ultimate aims of unity, freedom and socialism.

The political brain of the Revolution managed to utilise all those factors in favour of the success of the nationalisation operation, within the framework of the march of the Revolution. It provided all the pre-requisites that made nationalisation possible in the estimation of the

leadreship and assured it that, once the decision was taken, nationalisation would create an irresistible atmosphere. With the same ability, the leadership also furnished all the essentials for the success of the decision. Most important of these pre-requisites and essentials, and the main reason for winning moral and material support for the decision, was the fact that **we alone - leadership and people - bore full responsibility** for our own choice. Thus the support of brothers and friends became a natural matter, indeed an honour and a duty of which I do not think anybody would like to deprive himself.

QUESTION No.2

But, how did the leadership reach “point nationalisation”?... Was it a sudden decision?... Or was it a previously calculated decision?... If the latter were the case, what preparations preceded it?..... and under what circumstances?..... And on what axis did the deductions and speculations of others revolve?

Comrade Saddam Hussein:

Recognising the present period undergone by the Revolution as the phase of accomplishing all tasks of liberation and building popular democracy, necessarily means completely liberating oil resources and placing this wealth under the sovereignty of the people and at the service of the Revolution's central plan. Accordingly, nationalisation was a main objective and an integral part of the Revolution. Had it failed to attain it, our evaluation of the distance traversed by the Revolution along the path of the realisation of its

programmes and aims would have been different from what it is now.

The basic point here was not stressing on paper the nationalisation slogan as a target, because it is rightly said that nationalisation, as a slogan, is a common aspiration demanded by all etc. etc and that any person can grasp the nationalisation theory through studying the voluminous books on nationalisation, particularly on the experience of peoples in this field.

The basic point that faced us, as I said earlier, was not how to inculcate the slogan of nationalisation. It was how to apply the slogan. Strictly speaking, it was how to nationalise oil, and nothing else,..... here in Iraq and nowhere else..... and under the then obtaining circumstances and no others. Therefore, reaching point nationalisation, as your question puts it, assumes a different

and a special position and the decision, without conceipt or exaggeration, acquires a special importance.

Exploration should neither focus on the sheer idea of nationalisation nor on the abstract idea of liberating the oil wealth. **It should centre on the political brain and the political behaviour that elaborated, matured and turned the idea into a reality.** Had it not been for the successful implementation of the nationalisation act... had the result been other than the victory of March 1st... had a financial catastrophe taken place... had the outcome been as disappointing as that of previous experiments... then, certainly, many people would have been speaking about nationalisation in a different manner, within different frameworks.

The march of the Revolution and the nature of the phase, which we already referred to, pointed

at the inevitability of remedying the question of the national wealth, particularly the oil resources, and at determining the relationship with the foreign companies; and this was exactly what the leadership had determined to do.

The position and behaviour of the monopolising companies conflicted with the interests of the country. Therefore, it was imperative to resolve this contradiction in favour of exercising our sovereignty over our own wealth and for restoring our full rights in this field. In such an estimation, the leadership was bound to examine all probabilities. Uppermost of these possibilities was the intransigence of the companies regarding our lawful demands. This is to say: when the time was ripe to demand of the companies working out a new formula of relations other than that based upon plunder and extortion, there was the possibility

that the companies would retaliate by measures aiming at draining our energies and aborting our attempt. Thus, any decision similar to the nationalisation decision taken on June 1st 1972 must have been studied before that date; and the study must have covered all its dimensions, requirements and results.

To specify dates, the practical study of oil nationalisation commenced during July and August 1970, following confidential negotiations with the companies during which we felt their intransigence towards our legitimate demands. In the wake of later negotiations, during which all indications showed that the companies insisted upon keeping the old unjust terms of relations unchanged, a detailed formula of nationalisation was examined with concentrated effort in January and February 1972.

At that time, the national and financial resources began to be directed in new channels guarding against the expected development in relations with the companies as a result of the leadership's calculated determination not to retreat from our legitimate rights and to resort to unilateral legislation in case the companies persisted upon their traditional attitudes. Then important paragraphs of the nationalisation statement, announced on June 1st 1972, had already been written.

It may be useful to mention here that June 1st, as a revolutionary action, and March 1st as a concomitant decisive victory, were a surprise not only to the companies and imperialist states but also to many a benevolent person in Iraq, in the Arab homeland and in the world at large. However, were the march of the Revolution diff-

erently studied, and were the planning of the party and the psychology of the leadership accurately examined in a way different from that followed from 30th July 1968⁽¹⁾ up till the announcement of June 1st, the deductions of both enemies and friends would have naturally been different.

1) July 30th. 1968: This is the date when some officers (Abdul Razak al Naif and Abdul Rahman Raood) were expelled from the R.C.C. (Revolution Command Council) 13 days after the Revolution. These officers were right-wing and had relations with imperialist quarters. They jumped onto the July 17 Revolution because of their important military posts and tried to gear it according to their pro-imperialist and reactionary aims. The leadership of the Party, facing such a conspiracy, decided to get rid of them as soon as possible. On the 30th of July 1968, they were expelled from the R.C.C. and sent abroad.

The guiding revolutionary **political brain** had greatly benefited from the method by which the companies and imperialist states have used to infer their deductions. We can liken this to the advantage gained by the Socialist October Revolution from the ignorance of the capitalist world and the colonial states of the art of making a socialist revolution and of the art of applying socialist ideas according to various formulas that appear to the outside observer as having a tactical nature, which is neither perpetual nor growing. In other words, the October Revolution made use of the ignorance of the imperialist states and the capitalist class of the art of revolutionary tactic, and thus it managed to attain the successive stages of its development.

The political brain that led the July 17 Revolution greatly benefited from previous exper-

ience, particularly from the past experience of the Party, here in Iraq and there in Syria.

The inconsistent alliances created during that experience had always ended in the interest of the forces closest to counter-revolution or in favour of counter-revolution itself.

The verbal threats addressed by the then leaders against imperialist interests used to bear no tangible fruit in actual practice; nor did they follow the path of revolutionary determination. Slogans used to be hoisted, without finding their way to implementation. All these precedents trapped the companies and imperialist countries into misjudging the situation. They had imagined that July 17 would end up in something other than July 30th (1968). They had envisaged the

March Manifesto¹¹ as a temporary and tactical stance designed to help go through a certain stage. They had regarded relations with the revolutionary forces and the socialist states as a form of interim alliance. **And along this line of thinking, they interpreted the ultimatum delivered to them on 17.5.1972.**

Naturally, we were not sorry for the erroneous imaginings and calculations of the companies and imperialist states. On the contrary; **we benefited from them in escalating the chart indicator in favour of resolving matters towards the supreme strategic aims of the Party and the Revolution.**

11) The declaration made by the R.C.C. on March 11th 1970 about the democratic and peaceful settlement of the Kurdish problem.

Likewise, the companies and imperialist states committed a dual mistake. They wrongly envisioned our visit to the Soviet Union, which preceded June 1st, together with that article of the Iraqi-Soviet treaty providing for the Soviet Union's support for Iraq's line of liberating Iraqi oil resources, as a mere sort of tactics and pressure aimed at obtaining better terms in the deal with them. Secondly, after June 1st., they immagined that the nationalisation decision had been taken in Moscow.

Up to June 1st, rather until the moment of declaring the nationalisation, the companies failed to envisage that we would venture on nationalisation.

Here an important point should be clarified. Since we anticipated that the companies would resort to a war of attrition against us, it would have

been stupid not to prepare for a decisive and deterring battle against them. **It is stupid that a political leader does not choose to fight in the square before the outer fence and allows the enemy to infiltrate inside, thus compelling himself to fight them inside the house.** When the companies ventured the reduction of production, they aimed at cornering us in a state of self-defence, fighting on a point of clash very close to our inner doors, without being fortified by an exterior wall. In such a fight, if victory was not won by the dashing attacker, the battle would certainly not be in the advantage of the one defending himself in the heart of one's house.

When the companies chose, at an early stage, to engage in a “test of strength” battle, their aim was to exhaust the capabilities of Iraq - to drain the country’s economic resources and the morale of

its people. They drove at paralysing the challenging brain of the leadership of the Party and the Revolution.

This impelled the leadership to hasten waging the decisive battle before allowing the companies a lengthy period for a “test of strength”, whose outcome would have surely been in the latter’s favour. Accordingly, we delivered the ultimatum to the companies on 17.5.1972. Shortening the term of the ultimatum - two weeks only - was calculated from this angle; again, we did not allow the negotiations that took place at the expiry of the term to last for more than one day only. The political brain of the revolution refused to extend the term of the ultimatum despite the urging of the companies and despite the many opinions and advice that were rife at the time.

Another aspect of the battle is this: right from

the beginning, the leadership kept away from calculating by traditional methods, because treading common steps would not ensure the pre-requisites enabling the political brain take the nationalisation decision. Because a decisive and final decision on oil nationalisation, under the circumstances of Iraq and the area, had not been practised before, it was necessary to make calculations through new methods. True, it had been practised by Mosadiq, but the results indicated failure and not success. While realising the difference between the two experiments and between their domestic, regional and international surroundings, taking a decision similar to that of June 1st, undoubtedly, meant that success would be an honour enjoyed not only by the leadership of the Party and the Revolution but also by the entire people of Iraqi. On the other hand, the cons-

equences of the failure were the historic responsibility of the leadership alone. The leadership had consciously chosen this way, because those who claim to assume the vanguard position of Arab struggle must be ready to bear such a responsibility. Leaderships claiming to assume such a role are bound to pay the price of responsibility.

In the calculations of the battle, we did not speak of figures; nor did we mention the details of our financial situation prior to June 1st and before March 1st, because to talk in traditional ways would have demoralised the masses. That is why we stressed before the masses our new road - our new calculations that cannot be understood and arrived at by computers. Only the revolutionary brain that perceives the present and the future in a different vision can arrive at them.

Meanwhile, we, in the leadership of the Party and the Revolution, **never neglected accurate calculations.** We did calculate our financial and economic conditions meticulously. We did also direct them accurately. We were simultaneously aware that we would not have the opportunity to save large amounts of money to be deposited in banks as a safeguard against any risks that might ensue following embarkation upon nationalisation. We were also aware that the companies and imperialist states were able to discover our true financial assets. **But within our concern for accurate calculations, we resolved, in the few days that preceded the nationalisation decision, to transfer our hard currency assets in foreign banks to others not subject to the control of the monopolising companies and the states to be affected by the nationalisation.** That was a precaution against

the requisition of those assets by those companies and states in the same way followed by Britain and France after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956. We were confident that the companies, which must have known that step, had included our action in their usual erroneous calculations, believing that we were but exerting pressures and tactics with the ultimate goal of reaching a better “agreement”. Their imagination failed to reach the border of conceiving that our action was part of a plan aimed at oil nationalisation.

The slogan “**No Retreat But Forward**”, raised by the information media in the period between March 17th and June 1st, which became the popular songs and chants of the masses, was included in an internal circular on confrontation with the monopolies addressed to the Party machinery.

“Ath - Thawra” newspaper continually explained the situation and daily escalated the battle to heights that could not end in a situation of a conventional character.

In those days, we published the full text of the minutes of our negotiations with the companies. **It was then evident that any “wise” leadership would not escalate the situation to such a height of sharpness unless they had already resolved to take a decisive decision.** Nevertheless, the companies maintained their old pattern of conventional calculation and measured the situation in the light of their experience with previous regimes in Iraq and in the area. They kept imagining that the Revolution would not venture upon nationalisation.

At the time, there were **certain French quarters** which disagreed with the estimations of the

companies. They took into account that the Iraqi government might resort to unilateral legislation. But, certainly, even these more foresighted quarters **failed to envisage that the decision would be the nationalisation of the company.** On the basis of their own estimations, they tried to convince the other parties in the companies to reconsider their attitudes.

The French ambassador conferred with the Secretary-General of the Follow-up Committee **advising forbearance** in taking a unilateral decision in the hope that he would be able to convince the companies' representative, Stockwell, of the need to concede the government's demands. Shortly before the expiration of the second ultimatum (at 11.a.m. on June 1st, 1972) the French ambassador contacted the Secretary-General again and conveyed to him that he had done his best, but failed

to convince Stockwell.

So far concerning the companies and the imperialist states.

In the meantime, despite the operation of charging and escalating, which we carried out in the period between May 17th and June 1st, no slogan was raised in Iraq or elsewhere other than the common slogan demanding the wrenching of our legitimate rights from the companies and no retreat. **No one**, including the sincere people, raised the slogan of nationalisation. We rather used to hear pieces of advice on the need for deliberation and avoidance of haste in taking extremist decisions. In fact, proposals of a compromising character were presented to us.

Only moments before adopting the nationalisation decision, **excepting the leadership of the Revolution**, many people - including senior civil

servants - thought that the most drastic decision that might be taken would not go beyond a unilateral legislation imposing a portion of national sovereignty over the companies. This is a proof of the psychological mood created by the companies that drove many people into a state of hesitation and fear, leading them to dream of many things, except the decisive blow of nationalisation.

Now, speaking of nationalisation has become a customary affair, because the experiment was successfully accomplished, and because the one who dared dive into the river managed to swim skilfully and reach the other bank safely.

QUESTION №.3

What course did the battle take from the decision of June 1st to the victory of March 1st? I am not asking about the generally known factors. I mean those factors with a special nature that might be unknown to the masses.

Comrade Saddam Hussein:

As mentioned in the question, the general factors are known. But it might be useful to reiterate them. They include: the firmness of the leadership of the Party and the Revolution and their insistence upon no going back, and their conscious perseverance to follow the path of non-conventional calculations; the rallying of the masses around the historic decision and their spontaneous sacrifices; the collaboration of the country's patriotic forces; the massive enthusiasm that covered the Arab homeland and created an

atmosphere of support that was most useful to us, particularly in the first stages before it was marred by certain quarters; the international support of the progressive and honest forces and organisations and the socialist states, headed by the Soviet Union, which were the first to purchase our nationalised oil.

Along with these general factors, there was a special factor of a decisive character, namely, **the everyday general and detailed management of the affairs relating to the nationalisation decision**. Some people might imagine that the political leadership just took the decision of Junt 1st and left matters to be run by the technical quarters. What had taken place is actually totally different. Without belittling the importance and the role of the technical quarters, which exerted great and sincere efforts in preparing many details concern-

ing the decision of June 1st and the developments that ended on March 1st, **the steering of the battle had always remained in the hands of the political brain.** Comrades in the leadership and the advanced Party cadres took charge of these affairs daily. They did not merely supervise the proposed formulas; **they actually engineered them.**

The administration of the battle in this manner preserved the political revolutionary substance of the process of nationalisation and, simultaneously, ensured the maximum degree of efficiency needed for its practical success. Matters are still the same now.

Throughout those days, **every drop of oil was treated within a political perspective and within the strategic line of the Party and the Revolution, with due appreciation of the economic scope.**

Perhaps we are not disclosing a secret when

we mention that the total amount of oil we had managed to market just before March 1st was 48 million tons out of 57 million tons - the maximum output capacity of the Kirkuk oil fields. The 48 million tons we managed to sell were 20 million tons more than the amount (28 million tons) which the companies insisted upon as the maximum marketable quantity to justify their reducing production in the period that preceded the nationalisation. We sold nationalised oil to the following countries:

France, U.S.S.R., Spain, Turkey, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Egypt, Morocco and independent Westren companies.

QUESTION No.4

What about the Basrah Oil Company and the future relationship with it?

Comrade Saddam Hussein:

Among the calculations taken into account by the leadership for guiding the battle of nationalisation was threatening the companies with a raised hammer. Once they escalated their opposition to the nationalisation decision to the extent of using the navy force of the imperialist countries to prevent the marketting of the nationalised oil, the hammer would strike them once again.

As to the relationship with the Basrah Oil Company, it is common knowledge that we do not

at all object to dealing with any quarter or company on commercial grounds that do not violate our sovereignty, jeopardise our interests or conflict with our strategy on the regional and the pan-Arab levels. The situation before June 1st was different. Then the foreign companies constituted an element that threatened and encroached upon our sovereignty and that frivolled with the capabilities of the country. But the state of affairs has radically changed since June 1st. The steering wheel became in our own hands. Nevertheless, we must warn against any situation that might come into being in the future which is apt to create a conflict with our national sovereignty and interests. **Such a contradiction can be settled only in favour of our national sovereignty and interests.**

QUESTION No.5

What is the situation after the March 1st victory, and the lapse of one year since the historic nationalisation decision?

Comrade Saddam Hussein:

After March 1st, we, in the Party, have stressed the need for avoiding an error which had previously often been committed by leaders, governments and political parties. Victory might yield conceipt and prevent clear vision. But, in our opinion, victory requires from the revolutionary: modesty, maintenance of balance, shrewed immagination and ability to use the most accurate measures for leading the future march.

Any victory should be weighed according to its connection with the Arab revolution, because any

triumph achieved within any region constitutes a stride along the path of the central objectives of the Arab revolution. This necessitates the preservation of revolutionary vision and revolutionary endurance.

We were careful to stress this question in the internal Party education as well as in mass education. We have also warned against the risk of slipping into a state of relaxation and weak vigilance. The spirit of sacrifice and the degree of vigilance created by the June 1st decision should be maintained to face the intrigues of imperialism, reaction and monopolies. Self-confidence is a basic pre-requisite of leaderships, militants and the masses. But this confidence should not be allowed to develop into conceipt, thus depriving leadership, militants and the masses of the

**ability to work out the most accurate calculations
for confronting future possibilities..... and
“emergencies.”**

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